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I. WAS AN INVADER EVER SOVEREIGN
Orthodox doctrine has instructed us that in bygone times an
invading prince was understood to displace the ruler of the land
invaded in his sovereignty. Invasion operated as a temporary
annexation. Allegiance was due the invader, and not the former
sovereign. The invader could properly place the population in
his armies, or subject them to any severities he pleased.
It is perhaps doubtful whether such a view does not mistake
for an accepted theory the mala praxis of a moment. If the
invader were really a substituted sovereign, then the rudimen-
tary but quite definite and real restrictions which were placed
on his powers by the Law of Nations could have had no existence.
"Private property in land . . . .," says W. E. Hall,' "was very
early regarded as exempt from appropriation" by an invader;
the reason being that "an invader could not be reasonably sure
of continued possession for himself, nor could he give a firm title
to a purchaser." A sovereign who cannot give a firm title to
things within his sovereignty is almost a contradiction in terms I
As to personal property, Frederick II enumerates the things
which an occupied country is bound to supply to an invader: if
the invader were sovereign in the land, there could be no possi-
bility of such restrictions and no need of such enumeration. The
slaughter of non-combatants would be perfectly permissible, if
the invader were simply killing his own subjects. Yet we know
it was strongly reprobated by all authorities, and seldom or
never infringed on any large scale in practice, except in cases
of sack and storm, when it was excused rather than justified
by the supposed impossibility of controlling the soldiers.
Hall's declaration that up to the middle of the 18th century
practice conformed to the theory of substituted sovereignty
therefore appears to rest rather on the occurrence of violent
abuses than on any settled theory maintained in bygone times.
He gives no references to authorities, beyond saying that "in the
17th century express renunciation of fealty to the legitimate sov-
ereign was sometimes exacted." But we know that an oath of
submission to Queen Victoria was "sometimes" exacted from
Transvaalers in the nineteenth century; and we also know that it
was entirely unjustified. He quotes Frederick II's impressment
of Saxons in 1756 and 1758; and he subjoins Frederick's cynical
remark that a commander in enemy winter quarters will recruit
1HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1909) 419.
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from the country. But he omits to remark that when Frederick
made these recruitments it was not as a military occupant; it
was by virtue of a treaty-the Capitulation of Stouppen. The
incorporation of the Saxon Army in 1756 with the Prussian
was not accomplished by Frederick at his own hand, but was
one of the terms of this Convention. It is not very clearly ex-
pressed; 2 but, read literally, it hands over Saxony and the Saxon
army en bloc to Frederick; and having got them, was he not at
liberty, he argued, to use them? The deditio of the army was
unconditional (though it may be noted that the officers were
not included) ; and the whole kingdom was, at any rate tem-
porarily, to belong to Frederick, so that he might be excused
for regarding himself as temporary sovereign, and the popula-
tion as owing him a perfect, if temporary, allegiance. It must
be remarked, also, that this was a case of a complete conquest
of a kingdom; it was not the occupation of a part. The King
of Saxony was only able to continue the relations of a belligerent
because he happened at the same time to be King of Poland.
And the universal reprobation with which Frederick's step was
met surely shows that no such doctrine as that of "substituted
sovereignty" existed, which would have entitled him to take
recruits without any treaty at all.
The same sort of thing happened in the Baltic Wars of the
seventeenth century. When Charles X, Gustavus of Sweden,
causelessly invaded Poland in July, 1655, the King of Poland
(John Casimir) fled the country and took refuge in Silesia.
Many Polish regular troops thereupon submitted to the Swedish
king in October and November, and he put 7000 of them in the
army with which he attacked Polish Prussia, which still held out
for John Casimir, in the following January.2 A similar "sub-
mission" was earlier made by the Posnanian, Kalischian and
Lithuanian portion of the Polish forces; and the leader of the
latter recognized the invading king as Grand Duke of Lithuania.
Apparently the capitulations of submission involved the necessity
of taking service with the Swedish king; and we find 4 that the
soldiery subsequently maintained that in submitting to the pro-
tection of Sweden, in the hope of preserving their lives and
property, they had tacitly reserved the right of remaining faith-
ful to the Swedish king only until the times should alter, and
they should be able safely to return to the obedience of the
legitimate sovereign! Frederick II, therefore, was hardly an
innovator. Mercenaries, of course, were handed about much in
the same way as cavalry, horses and cannon. When Charles-
Gustavus was forced to quit Poland and to turn his armies
2 CARLIME, HISTORY OF FRIEDRICH II (1859).
3 12 KOCH & SCHOELL, Traitis de Paix: (1817) 172, 177, 171.
4 Ibid. 181.
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in 1657 against Denmark, he took Itzehod and placed 3000 Ger-
man mercenaries whom he found there in his own army.- But
we find no case mentioned of recruiting in an occupied terri-
tory, to which no dynastic claim was laid.
A stronger instance in support of Hall's position seems to be
afforded by the sale, cited by him, of the Swedish duchies of
Bremen and Verden by Denmark to George I of England, fla-
grante bello. But was this in reality more than a sale of the
possession and the ultimate reversion? It is said that the treaty
has never been printed, but Koch & Schoell 0 tell us that on
June 26, 1715, Denmark ceded to Hanover for cash down, these
two duchies (formerly bishoprics) but so executory did the
whole matter remain, that on September 6, 1715, by the Treaty
of Greifswald between Russia and Great Britain, it was dis-
tinctly agreed that when peace should be made with Sweden,
they "should be" ceded to Hanover, and they were duly ceded
in 1719. This shows that the "cession" by Denmark was a purely
reversionary thing. And as a matter of fact, the King of Great
Britain paid to Sweden at the definite cession in 1719 the interim
income which he had received in the meantime from the duchies.7
Not only that, but he indemnified the landed proprietors for their
sequestrated rents, and restored to Sweden the military material
seized in the duchies. Just in the same way, sixty years earlier,
when Sweden invaded Poland, she ceded to Brandenburg, "dans
toute souveranit6 et propriet6," four Polish provinces which she
had over-run.8 But by the treaty of Labian 9 (five months
later) the Elector promised to renounce these promises, in case
it should not be possible to obtain the cession of some part of
them at least from Poland. This shows that they were not
regarded as completely transferred to the sovereignty of Sweden
by the mere fact of occupation.
The fact is that prior to the Peace of Westphalia, and even
for some time afterwards, the non-centralized states of the
period were composed of somewhat loosely-compacted feudalized
elements; on invasion, the feudal head very often transferred
his allegiances to the new-comer in return for protection, and
of course this carkied the adherence and support of the local
population. Technically, this was treason and rebellion, but it
5 The transfer of all Germans serving in the Danish army to the service
of Sweden was one of the demands made prior to the treaty of Roskilde in
1658. Ibid. 238.
613 ibid. 257.
7 Ibid. 291. Great Britain now made the first of her alliances with
Sweden to secure the Baltic against the growing power of Russia.
8 Treaty of Marienburg, June 15, 1656. 12 Koch & Schoell, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 183.
9 Ibid. 188 (secret article).
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does not always seem to have been very seriously regarded as
such. 0
By the Treaty of Roskilde (1658), 12 a convention very unfa-
vorable to Denmark, Sweden ceded to Denmark "all the rights
and claims which she might have (peut azobr) to (aux) the
islands, provinces, towns, or fortresses which she has occupied
in the course of the war, in Denmark, Norway or the Duchy of
Holstein." If she had acquired them in full sovereignty by the
very fact of occupation, the language of this article would have
been entirely different. It is very restrained and conditional,
and suggests rather such things as claims in respect of impcase
utiles during the occupation, though it may not be limited to
that. It is true that at the Peace of Oliva (1660), Poland
ceded to Sweden "all the rights which might (pouvoicat) up
to the present belong to" her in Esthonia l--which had for
exactly 100 years been in Swedish occupation,23 much the same
dubious expression ("peut avoir," "pouvoicizt appetcaif"), be-
ing thus used in regard to both sovereign and occupier. But
the explanation of the use of the potential mood by the Polish
sovereign is that Poland had never effectively ruled in Esthonia.
The Teutonic Order bought it in 1347 from Denmark,"4 but
in 1561, under pressure of a Russian invasion, the Master of the
Order purported to cede it, along with the other territory of
the Order in the vicinity, to Poland (or rather to Lithuania).
But he could not deliver the goods; they were in the hands of
the enemy, and in fact the people of Esthonia threw themselves
into the hands of Sweden, so that the King of Poland and Lith-
uania was never able to make his rule effective, and during the
long wars and truces of the ensuing hundred years, they re-
:o The Peace of Olivia (1660) (Art. 16) contains a very interesting pro-
vision concerning one Court Koeningsmark, which may here be mentioned,
although irrelevant. He was a distinguished commander, who was taken, on
Sept. 11, 1656, out of a Swedish vessel by the Dantzigers, when on a voyage
to Prussia (doubtless ducal or Brandenburg Prussia). The Swedes com-
plained, like the British in the Trent case, that he was a mere passenger.
The Lord Protector of England wrote to the City of Dantzig in his favor,
but the King of Poland as its feudal superior, directed its magistrates to
refuse his release on any terms. He and the Duke of Courland, who had
been kidnapped by Sweden, were both to be honorably set at liberty, sign-
ing "reversals" by which they undertook to seek no revenge. As the Count
asserted that his capture was contrary to the Law of Nations, the Dantzig
magistrates were very an:dous to be saved harmless in the matter. The
case is an early anticipation of the modern doctrine, which it is interesting
to find so well established in 1660. 12 KocH & ScHoELL, op. cit. -Zipm note
3, at 354.
1Ibid. 243 (Art. 12).
12 Ibid. 346.
,Ibid. 24.
1L4 Ibid. appx. 393 (correcting the date, 1352, given in the text, page 15).
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mained in Swedish hands,15 thus amply justifying the use of
the potential mood by the Poles at the Peace of Oliva.
One of the few passages in which there seems direct evidence
of military service being enforced on the subjects of an occupied
territory occurs in Art. 14 of this Peace: "Persons who have
been obliged to take up arms on one side or the other shall
be regarded as prisoners," and set at liberty. 6 Whether this
implies recruitment in occupied territory, or only extends to
troops taken over by capitulation, remains uncertain. As we
have seen, on the Swedish invasion of Poland, the local mag-
nates affected to place their territories under the protection
of Sweden, and it would not be surprising if they permitted the
Swedes to recruit from the local population.
The same Peace of Oliva (1660) provided 1 7 that the judg-
ments pronounced and the contracts made in places occupied
during the previous war by the Swedes, should be confirmed,
except those pronounced in Riga against Lithuania and Cour-
land subjects, or by Lithuanian or Courland judges against sub-
jects of Swedish Livonia, which were annulled. If the occupant
was sovereign, there would be no need of such confirmation.
As an instance of the way in which dynastic claims to de jure
sovereignty complicated the question, we may take the Swedish
occupation of Livonia. The Swedes had long been in military
occupation of Livonia at the time of the Peace of Oliva, but
they did not claim to hold it by right of conquest, but as the
grantees of imperial rights over Livonia from Charles V, Fer-
dinand I, and Maximilian as Emperors. The grants were not
forthcoming, but the Poles did not deny their existence-only
they said they confirmed a protectorate against Russian en-
croachments, and nothing in the nature of sovereignty. In the
course of the negotiations, the Poles demanded that inhabitants
of Livonia who had fled the country on the Swedish invasion,
and had left their estates, should be reinstated in them; this
they completely failed to secure, and the case is thus an authority
against the proposition that an invader from early times never
confiscated landed property. 8 The Swedish occupation had, how-
ever, lasted eighty or ninety years, since the invasions of the
sixteenth century, which the Truces of 1629 and 1635 had not
interrupted in any respect. '
Hall cites also the case of the Austrians who are said to have
1G The Swedes vindicated their position by force of arms against Russia,
which in 1595 definitely recognized their right to Esthonia, by the Peace
of Teusin. Ibid. 65.
16 Ibid. 352.
17 Art. IV, par. 4.
is HALL, loc. cit. supra note 1.
19 See KOCH & SCHOELL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 322.
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placed Bavarian militia in their Italian armies in 1743. But
here again the Austrians had made a complete conquest of
Bavaria and expelled the Elector. True, he was still seeking
to oppose them with foreign support-but Bavaria as an inde-
pendent unit was entirely in the power of Austria, as Saxony
in 1756 was in the power of Prussia. The fact that the Clief
of each state was still making armed efforts from without to
recover his power might well be regarded as immaterial. After
James II had been expelled from England, it may not have
affected King William's title to that kingdom, nor his ability
to impress Englishmen, that King James was still making efforts
to maintain himself in Ireland.
When the Danes entered and occupied Stralsund, Riigen and
Pomerania beyond the Peene after driving out the Swedes in
1715, Schoell-02 tells us that the Danish king "s'y fit prfter hom-
mage." Exactly what this meant and involved is not clear. The
capitulation of Stralsund may have authorized it. And it is
not said that the King of Prussia "s'y fit prfter hommage" in
Stettin, and Swedish Pomerania between the Peene and Oder,
which he occupied on the same occasion. The important things
to know would be, whether the Danish king interfered with the
local laws, and whether he drafted the population into his
armies. There is no evidence that he did. And when the
Swedes occupied Hamburg in 1657 we are told that they got
provisions and clothing there (probably gratis), but not that
they got recruits.-1 In 1700, Count Fleming, with 2000 Saxon
cavalry invaded Swedish Livonia from Poland with the pro-
fessed object of raising the country against the Swedish king;
but they would not join him, which does not look much like
supporting the proposition that he could have pressed them.
Perhaps the strongest cases in favor of the asserted prin-
ciple are those in which King Louis XIV is asserted to have
exacted oaths of allegiance from the then Dutch cities of Namur
and Hainault in 1692. But we know that Louis was accustomed
to consider himself supr, leges: we tnow that he affected to
invade Holland and the Palatinate "sans que la paix soit rom-
pue de notre part"-and it will take more than this typical
Ludivican high-handedness to prove a rule. Not being a his-
torian, I do not wish to deny that there was a received doctrine
of substituted sovereignty; but I say that there seems sin-
gularly little evidence of it.-22
20 13 ibiL 256.
21 Ibid. 225.
2 2 Wolf, indeed, is quoted in 3 Nys, LE Dnorr INTEnvA,,TIoxAL (1912) 259
(transl.) as saying: "In making conquest of towns and districts, he mahes
conquest of, or occupies, also the sovereignty over them; as a consequence
the inhabitants become subjects of the conqueror; they cease to be enemies,
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No doubt, much that was barbarous was done in the Thirty
Years War-but will anybody say that it was all done in the
name of legality? The proofs of a legal doctrine of substi-
tuted sovereignty seem to be somewhat markedly wanting. The
English medieval wars with France and Scotland were compli-
cated by claims of right to the allegiance of the invaded realms
or to the homage of their rulers.2 3 But do we ever find a hint
that William or David of Scotland regarded the Yorkshiremen
as his subjects when he invaded England? Or did Henry of
England consider Frenchmen his subjects after Ardres and the
spurs? Or Francis of France consider Castilians Frenchmen?
Or did Charles V treat Picardy as his own? There seems to be
no trace in the wars of medieval times of any doctrine of sub-
stituted sovereignty.
Hall admits that after. the Seven Years' War "these violent
usages fell into desuetude." . It hppears to me that they had
fallen into desuetude long before, and that they never rested
on any doctrinal basis of "substituted sovereignty," but were
mere abuses of force, reprobated by all authorities. As early
as 1694 DeVillene told Marshal de Noailles that "les peuples con-
quis par la force des armes, .... ne doivent 6tre consid6r6s
comme sujets du prince qui a la domination de leur pays, qu'au
cas de vdritable cession ensuite de la conclusion d'un paix." 24
II. RECENT APPARENT REVIVAL OF THE DOCTRINE
However all this may be, it is common ground that there is
and nothing can be permitted to be done to their prejudice which is per-
mitted against the enemy; that only can be done which may be done
against one's own subjects in virtue of sovereignty." But Wolf seems to
refer to a complete conquest, not a mere military occupation; he wrote in
1740-8, and if he meant to equate occupation to consolidated conquest, his
statement is inconsistent with the facts. It may be explained by the notori-
ous circumstance that Wolf, like Puffendorf, attempted to derive the
prescriptions of International Law from abstract principles of justice,
styled "The Law of Nature," and frequently deduced from Roman law.
In Roman law an enemy had no rights; his property lay open to acquisition
in full ownership by occupation. This simple scheme of things doubtless
commended itself to Wolf's theoretic mind. As Woolsey says, his school
were prone to present the spinnings of their own brains as the Law of
Nations.
The writer has not had the opportunity of consulting the works of
LAIEIRE: THonm ET PRATIQUE DE LA CONQUATE DANS L'ANCIEN DIOIT
(1902); L'OCCUPATE MILITAIR EN ITALE (1903); LES OCCUPATIONS IILI-
TAMES EN ESPAGNE (1905).
23 Thus, when Lewis of France invaded England in 1216, he claimed the
kingdom in right of his wife, Blanche of Castile. Naturally, the barons
and Londoners, who favored him, swore fealty' to him as king de jure. So,
also, when Charles VIII of France invaded Naples in 1494.
243 NYS, op. cit. supra note 22, at 230.
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no substituted sovereignty nowadays, nor has there been since
the mid-eighteenth century; though a "quasi-sovereignty," in-
vesting the invader with large powers, but not altering the
national character of the territory and inhabitants, has been
very commonly maintained.2-
But some startling developments have marked the recent
European war. The national character of Egypt and Cyprus
was purported to be changed, flagrante bello, by a power which
would have been the first to exclaim against any change in the
national character of Flanders. The national status of Egypt was
legally that of a vassal province of Turkey; the special inter-
vention of Great Britain had modified this since 1882 in a more
or less ill-defined manner, but certainly Egypt was not part of
the British Empire. On the outbreak of war between Britain
and Turkey, the former power purported to dissolve the bond
which united Turkey to Egypt, and to set up a new bond between
Egypt and herself. As the Egyptians were in theory Turldsh
subjects, and liable to be called on to assist the Sultan against
his enemies, the enormous importance of this proceeding can
hardly be exaggerated. The national character of Egypt, which
was Turkish, was affected to be changed, converted into that of
a vassal of Turkey's enemies!
So entirely was it recognized that Egypt was in theory part
of the Ottoman dominions, that Egypt never sent or received
foreign envoys, the Turk capitulations applied in all their force
to Egypt, and the Egyptian flag was that of the Ottoman Em-
pire. It may be a question whether, after the firmans conceding
the government of Egypt to the line of A ohamet Ali, the relation
of Egypt to Turkey was that of an autonomous province, or
that of a mi-souverain vassal. It does not matter which it was:
neither Egypt nor England had any power to destroy it.
The only explanations of the powers are either that Egypt,
whether a province or a vassal, rebelled against its ruler or its
suzerain, and gave itself as a vassal or as a subject province, to
his enemy; or that Britain made an illegitimate use of the rights
of an occupant. The fact that the enemy was already in military
occupation of the country made rebellion easy, but did not make
it lawful.
We may be reminded of the Treaty of Copenhagen, made be-
tween Sweden and Brandenburg in 1661, by which the Dukedom
of Prussia threw off the suzerainty of Poland and accepted that
of Sweden. By the Treaty of KXenigsberg (1656), the Elector
25 W. E. Hall's objections to the recognition of such a "quasi-sovereignty"
are rather thin. On all lands, the powers of the invader have limits. On
all lands, these limits are very wide. Whether we call their sum "quasi-
sovereignty" or "the military exigencies of an occupying force" does not
seem really to make very much difference.
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of Brandenburg disclaimed the suzerainty of Poland in respect
of his Prussian Dukedom (formerly the possession of the Teu-
tonic Knights) and accepted that of Sweden. The decent ex-
cuse, however, was offered, that the Elector's suzerain, the
Polish king, had failed to protect him from the Swedish invasion,
and had therefore forfeited his feudal rights.20  Charles IX
of Sweden had seized Elbing and Thorn, and penetrated up to
Welau,27 within twenty-five miles of Kcenigsberg, where lay
the Elector-Duke. Moreover, Ducal Prussia was in no sense
an integral if autonomous part of Poland, as Egypt was of
Turkey.28 The people were not subjects of the King of Poland,
as the Egyptians were of the Sultan of Turkey. It may be
added that Sweden and Ducal Prussia promised each other lib-
erty to recruit in Royal (Polish) and Ducal Prussia respectively.
But doubtless such recruitment was voluntary; neither ruler
would have cared to concede compulsory rights to his neighbors."
If it is true that the Khedive of Egypt was the Sultan's officer,
and the Egyptians the Sultan's distant subjects, then the Prus-
sian precedent is of no applicability. But if it is held that the
Sultan's authority in Egypt was a shadow merely, and his flag
in Egypt a symbol of nothing in particular, the Khedive being
his vassal and not his officer, then the Prussian precedent is much
in point. But what a precedent! One drawn from the obsolete
practice of the seventeenth century!
It is believed that the United States never acknowledged the
severance, flagrante bello, of the tie which bound Egypt to Tur-
key, until Turkey herself acknowledged it-not even when they
became an ally of the intrusive power. Had Egypt enjoyed a
really international position-had she had a separate flag and
a separate nationality and separate diplomatic representation
in the capitals of the world-it would have been a very difficult
and delicate question to determine whether after the outbreak of
war she could have joined with the enemies of her suzerain, to
levy war upon the latter. It would have been a triple question-
(1) whether she could become a lawful combatant against Turkey
at all; (2) whether, granted that she could, she could become
so on any and every occasion, or whether she could only in case of
breach of her privileges on the part of the suzerain; (3) whether,
granted that she enjoyed the liberty possessed by entirely inde-
26 This was a common excuse. Esthonia in 1561 justified the repudiation
of the suzerainty of the Teutonic Order on the ground that for four years
they had failed to protect her against the Russians. 12 KOCH & ScHOELL,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 24.
27 Near the field of Friedland.
28 Though appeals went from the Prussian ducal courts to the court of
the King of Poland. See Treaty of Kcenigsberg, Art. 17.
29 Ibid. art. 20.
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pendent states of going to war when and with whom she pleased,
she was guilty of any breach of faith or promise to her suzerain
in turning upon her. And I imagine that the questions would be
answered in the sense that a vassal state is not only wrong in
making war on her suzerain, but is incapable of doing so,
except in the simple ease of a breach by the suzerain of the pact
of submission, (such as is afforded by an armed attack on the
vassal), or in self-defense. It would seem impossible to allow
that a vassal can at pleasure repudiate her vassalage, and join
with her suzerain's enemies. And to say that vassals did it in
the seventeenth century is not an answer. Vassals only did it
in the seventeenth century when the suzerain had broken the
fundamental pact. Is it argued that Turkey had failed to pro-
tect Egypt against England? In the first place, that formed no
part of the Turco-Egyptian pact; in the second place, England
was in Egypt ostensibly not as an enemy, but as a friend,
supporting the Khedive for the Khedive's own good.
But Egypt was not in fact a vassal state. It was merely an
autonomous part of the Sultan's dominions. Not only had Egypt
no separate flag, no separate diplomatic missions, no separate
treaties, but it was expressly provided in the Convention of Lon-
don of 1840, between Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia and Tur-
key, that- "(6) The military and naval forces which may be
maintained by the Pasha of Egypt and Acre, forming part of the
forces of the Ottoman Empire, shall always be considered as
maintained for the service of the State." Judge Phillimore de-
cided in The Clw 0ieh 3 that the ruler to whom the administra-
tion of Egypt had irrevocably been committed by the Sultan of
Turkey was not even a semi-sovereign, but a mere privileged sub-
ject or officer of the Porte. Mr. John Bassett Mloore's invaluable
Digest similarly indexes the treatment of the Mixed Courts of
Egypt under the head of "Turkey." 1
When Austria converted the occupation of Bosnia in 1908 into
annexation, much severe comment was passed on the pretension.
It was improper, but not an iota worse than the conversion of
Egypt and Cyprus in 1914. It had no immediate practical conse-
quences, and it remained open for Turkey to protest and finally
to secure concessions in return. But the annexation of Cyprus
and the virtual annexation of Egypt, flagrantc bello, had infin-
itely important practical results, turning the population of the
localities from the subjects into the enemies of the Porte.
The only possible excuse for the English action in Egypt
would be that Egypt had by some tacit process been annexed
(or converted into a colonial protectorate-it is the same thing)
30 L. R. 4 Adm. and Eccl. 59,120 (187).
312 MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1906) § 286.
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already. But Britain had so often and so emphatically pro-
claimed that she was occupying Egypt for temporary purposes
only, that this shameless defense is not available. It must, I
think, be considered, before long, whether and to what extent
one country may be in peaceful occupation of territory belong-
ing to another without being (at any rate temporarily) re-
garded as the sovereign of its inhabitants to all intents and
purposes. Should it go to war with a third state, the situation
of these inhabitants must otherwise be too precarious and anom-
alous. But this is a large and difficult question, with which it
is impossible here to deal.
How could Great Britain, in 1914, seize and incorporate into
her own service against the Sultan the army in Egypt which was
by the convention of 1840 distinctly declared to be the Sultan's
army? Was the Treaty of 1840, like that of 1830, a "scrap of
paper"? Egypt could only be torn away from Turkey by Turk-
ish cession; flagrante bello to assume to appropriate it as a
"protectorate," and to turn its troops from their allegiance was
no more proper than it would have been for the Germans to tear
away Flanders from Belgium and to force the Flemings to take
up arms against King Albert. Everybody knows what a modern
"protectorate" is; it is a mere synonym for a colony to which one
refuses the rights of citizenship. Egypt, after 1914, began to
figure in "Whitaker's Almanac" as a component part of the Brit-
ish Empire. Essentially, the transaction was a return to the
vicious old practice-if it ever really was a practice-of con-
quest by mere occupation.
The case of Cyprus is even less defensible. Cyprus was handed
over by Turkey in 1878 to be administered by Great Britain as
long as Batavia and Kars were held by Russia. But the Cypriotes
did not become British subjects. It was for some time even a
question whether the rights of foreign countries to the benefit
of the Capitulations conferring extra-territorial status on their
people did not continue to subsist. To affect to annex the island,
and to turn the people uno ictu from subjects of the Sultan to
enemies of the Sultan, was totally at variance with the modern
principle of International Law which refuses to allow a military
occupant to play fast and loose in this way with the allegiance
of the population.
Had the Germans affected to set up a dummy kingdom in
Flanders and Brabant, independent of King Albert, or had they
fomented a republican government which should have declared
His Majesty to have forfeite- the throne of Belgium, we should
rightly have objurgated it as German arrogance. It would have
been patently incompatible with the principle that national alle-
giance cannot be diverted by a military occupant. Yet we allow
the thinnest of veils to obscure the fact that the British did alter
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the allegiance of the Egyptians in Egypt and of the Cypriotes
in Cyprus.
III. INVADERS AND DONA FIDE REVOLTS
This brings us to the tonsideration of the main question
which we purpose for discussion. It was easy for Sweden in
Poland, or Poland in Prussia, or Britain in Egypt or in Cyprus,
to claim the allegiance of the populace, because such Powers
could readily secure the allegiance of the local magnate-he
joined them with his territory and army. But in these days of
impersonal rule, it will not always be so easy.
In these Egyptian and Cypriote cases, the process of annexa-
tion or change of suzerainty was a very simple thing. The Brit-
ish had in each case a light grip on the country; and all that was
requisite was to declare their will. It was very easy to proclaim
the deposition of an absent Pasha and to seat an obedient puppet
on the tinsel throne. But the facility of the process must not
blind us to the fact that it would have been no less legal, had it
not been easy. The rebellion of a toy king against his Sultan
constituted a thin veil. The forced rebellion of an island against
the Sultan was hardly even a form. But there -ill be cases in
the future in which the rebellion will not be a forn.
What is to prevent an invader, in the future, from fomenting
rebellion in occupied territory, and even from covertly enforcing
it? Very little, that the writer can see; and in this way the
invader very readily disembarrasses himself of the difficulties
erected by the modern Law of Nations, forbidding him to alter
the local laws and to force the local population into his army
against their rightful sovereign.
Let us first consider the case in which a rebellion is what
we may call a bona fide rebellion, unconcerned with, though
perhaps not unconnected with, the fact of invasion and war. A
disaffected faction makes a pronnciamcnto, and declares that
"the ruling family has ceased to reign," or that "the province
of Baretania is and ought to be independent." The usual test of
the result of such proceedings is to inquire whether the old gov-
ernment is still continuing its efforts to maintain itself with any
reasonable prospect of success. But if the territory is in the
hands of an invader the test becomes entirely inapplicable. The
prize for which the old government and the new one are con-
tending-the control of the population-is removed out of their
reach by the third party, the invading occupant. Various com-
plications will also invariably arise in practice. It is seldom that
the occupied area, itself constantly varying, and not to be meas-
ured in broad territorial divisions, but counted in comparatively
small units,32 will coincide precisely with the area of revolt. The
32 E. g.. the French canton, some eight or nine miles square, was protczt-
ed against as too large a unit, in the war of 1870.
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latter may be within the occupied area, may adjoin the occupied
area, may be mainly without it though partly within it or vice
versa-or it may be pretty equally within and without. It may
be concentrated, and clearly evidenced by the definite acts of
local rulers, such as the palatines of Poland or the secession
legislatures of North America. Or it may be sporadic and pro-
claimed merely by juntas and self-styled patriots. In all these
cases somewhat different considerations appear to apply. But,
reserving the treatment of the others, let us take first what, per-
haps illusively, seems to be the simplest, and consider the case
of an area forming a local unit under a distinct authority, and
well enclosed in the area of occupation. Let us suppose also
that the occupation is of a fairly duraBle character. The obvious
example would be that of a town aggrieved by national tolls or
imposts, which declares itself, through its mayor and council, a
Free City. But since such a city could hardly make head against
the forces of the State, in modern times, (though such towns as
Buenos Aires and Sydney might be reasonably sustained as ex-
ceptions) we shall suppose a somewhat larger area. Say that a
maritime province, rich and energetic, and occupied by a for-
eign enemy, as Catalonia was by France in 1808, revolts against
its sovereign. A deliberate act by the local authorities proclaims
its independence; it organizes an executive and a legislature and
is accepted by the courts. What must be the attitude of the
invader, of the territorial sovereign and of third parties?
Is it quite adequate to say that the decision must be postponed
until the force of the invading power is withdrawn? Is "the
sacred right of revolution" suspended indefinitely by invasion?
The state system may be honeycombed with many absurd privi-
leges, many obvious anachronisms. Are the people obliged to
suffer them until they are left face to face with their old rulers?
The administration may be staffed by nominees of the central
government, hateful to and hated by, the local population. Can
they not be got rid of? Must everything, save for the exigencies
of the invading forces, be left in statu quo? In short, must we
say that because the test of force is inapplicable, we are left with
no test?
It is easier to raise such questions than to solve them. For the
eighteenth century thinker, for whom the population was nor-
mally the patrimony of a monarch, the problem would doubtless
tend to be resolved in the sense of refusing the right of revolt,
except where the facts proved too patent for contradiction. For
the rapidly dying race of parliamentary democrats, the whole
question would turn to the desires of the population, as expressed
by some form of vote or supposedly representative action. If a
local assembly voted for independence with virtual unanimity,
or if aplebiscite, however rigged, pronounced in the same sense,
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such thinkers might probably accept the vote as a test in cases
such as we are considering, where the recognized test of force
is impossible. But realistic thinkers who see, on the one hand,
that the patrimonial conception even in monarchical states (such
as Persia) is dead-and, on the other, that political machinery
is extraordinarily fallacious as an expression of genuine popular
desire,33 and who see, moreover, that the genuine desire of a
local part is not necessarily entitled to overcome the wishes of
the collective whole of a given political organism, will find the
problem a perplexing one.
Upon the whole, it would seem safest that the decision should
be against the possibility of any change; chiefly on the practical
ground that if such a possibility were recognized it would in-
fallibly be turned by the invader to his advantage.
An invader will, in ordinary circumstances, be extremely fool-
ish if he neglects to avail himself of offers of assistance volun-
teered by individual members of the invaded population.
Treasonable, technically or substantially, these offers may be; the
invader is under no obligation to decline to avail himself of
treason. But he cannot coerce the dissentients; he cannot force
his enemies to be his soldiers, or his guides, or his law-givers.
Can they force each other? One cannot but think that the prin-
ciple of the Roman civil law and of English equity jurisprudence
here applies, which renders trustees, tutors and mandatories in-
capable of doing certain things, not because they might not con-
ceivably be honestly done, but because of the extreme difficulty
of proving them to have been dishonest. A cestui que trust is
to have absolute security from his trustee in such transactions;
he is not to be presented with a lawsuit. So, in Internation.a
Law, a belligerent is not to sink a neutral at all, and is not to
capture on suspicion delzors the ship's papers. The minor and
the neutral are not to be saddled with lawsuits for the conveni-
ence of the trustee and the belligerent. And similarly, I imagine,
hard as it may be on the population, hostile occupation suspends
their right of revolution altogether. The sovereign ought not to
be put to the impossible task of proving that the revolt was
collusive and not spontaneous. Votes there may have been-
but were they free? Resolutions there may have been-but vere
they representative? The imperious question of allegiance can-
not be left to depend on such occasions for quibble and contradic-
33 Heimweh, an enthusiastic partisan of plebiscites, admits that the
French plebiscites taken on the successive invasions by the revolutionary
armies, of the Netherlands and the Rhineland, were thoroughly fallacious.
And it may be recalled that Nice and Savoy voted in ISGO almost by una-
nimity to be French rather than Italian! DROIT Dr CONQULTE ET Paw.Is-
CITES (1896) 25.
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tion. The tests by which International Law works must be clear
and indisputable.
But, reverting to our other suppositious cases, there are those
in which the test may be clear, although the situation is compli-
cated by invasion. Assume that a definite province, with at any
rate some amount of local government as a unit, is invaded at
some small and limited strategic point, and thereafter rises in
revolt against its own rulers in the unoccupied and dxtensive
area. As the war drags on, its revolt is firmly established-it
is not attacked by the mother country, and no attempt is made to
reduce it to obedience. It is difficult to see why its independence
should not have fulfilled the test of fact. True, the mother
country hopes some day to reduce it when her hands are free-
but so Spain hoped some day to reduce Chile and Peru. Does the
mere fact that she is carrying on war against other enemies in
other quarters preserve her rights over her recalcitrant child?
There seems no reason why it should, even in the difficult case
where the campaign against that enemy is in the immediate
neighborhood, though there may well be two opinions as to that.
It is difficult to agree with Hall 34 that "there can be no question
that conquest [of an entire state] cannot be held to be consoli-
dated while a war continues which by any reasonable chance
may extend fo the conquered territory." A foreign enemy may
well prefer to treat the conquered country as incorporated and
often to attack rather than as an occupied country open only to
release. And if this disagreement is justified, it must be equally
true that a revolt may be held to be consolidated, and indepen-
dence established, although the mother country may still be
carrying on a war which might involve at some stage a re-
assertion in practice of her sway. It surely would not prevent
Iceland from becoming independent of Denmark, that Denmark
was carrying on a war against Holland, the theatre of which
might by a "reasonable chance" be transferred to Iceland. But
would such a successful assertion of independence carry the oc-
cupied portion of the province, so that the invading enemy in
alliance with the revolted state, could treat the population as a
recruiting-ground. It may seem pedantic to doubt this, but I
believe the doubt would be justified. The inhabitants of the oc-
cupied territory here had no chance of disputing by force the
new state of affairs; they should not be affected by it. It may be
said that if they had been cut off by some natural means from
participating in the revolt, they could none the less be affected
by it. I question whether this is true. It does not appear to
me that a revolt, successful on the mainland, necessarily and ipso
34 HALL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 486. He is speaking of the question of
Genoa, a republic entirely subjugated by the French forces, whilst France
was still at war with Great Britain.
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facto carries the allegiance of adjacent islands, comprised in the
same territorial division. Revolt, like occupation, is measured
by actual control; and until that control is exercised in fact in
any part of the insurgent area, such part cannot properly be
said to be comprised in the insurrection. It is a temptation to
use the facile means afforded by the existence of local areas of
subordinate government, and to say that if a local capital has
pronounced in favor of revolt, the whole province, country, is-
land, must be considered as revolted. But it is fallacious. No
local power can avail to make a rebel of anyone within its borders
except by a successful assertion of control.31
Let us now take the more difficult case in vwhich the main part
of the insurgent territory lies within the occupied territory. If
the brain of the revolt is outside, shall we say that the same
principles apply? That the small, but self-conscious, outside
territory becomes capable of independence, whilst the main bulk,
though sympathetic, remains unchanged in allegiance? That
would seem to be exceedingly dangerous; the small area is within
the orbit of the invading influence, though out of the invader's
control; to allow it to secede would be to expose it to certain
absorption. Yet, since it is ex hypothsi small, it would be
better to admit the possibility of its secession, for the sake of
simplicity and certainty. Even suppose the brain, the active
ganglion of revolt, to be within the occupied area, and exposed
to the invasive influences. Still one considers that for the avoid-
ance of subtlety, the small outside area may be allowed to revolt?
The crucial difficulty comes when the parts, outside and inside
the invaded area, are approximately equally divided, ad tMe
brain inside. It is hard, in such a case, to adhere to our prin-
ciple, and allow the outside important half to be virtually carried
over to the enemy. But the maintenance of the principle, even
in such a hard case, presents the fewest difficulties.2
IV. INVADERS FOMENTING REVOLT
At last we can approach the final and crucial group of cases;
those, that is, in which the invading enemy not only desires to
35 The writer is not here referring to subordinate states which enjoy come
measure of international sovereignty, or whose alleged right of secession or
revolt implies it.
36 The case in which the invader enters the country solely to vindicate the
independence of the revolting territory can only be regarded as war, how-
ever disguised and benevolent. Thus the invasions of Crete by Greece in
1896, of Flanders by Louis Philippe, of the Morea by Charles X, were
really acts of war against Holland and the Porte. One does not besiege
fortresses and occupy whole premises as a means of coercion without in
essence waging war, however little one may like the prospect. And thoce
who say one can, only afford encouragement and comfort to lawless violence.
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avail himself of revolution, but actually inspires and foments
it. Here, it would seem, there can exist no doubt. It is not open
to an occupying enemy to do indirectly what he cannot do di-
rectly, and force the local population into active hostility to their
sovereign under color of insurrection. If, during the war of
1812, the United States had occupied Lower Canada, and had
availed themselves of local disaffection to secure a proclamation
of secession and alliance with themselves, the allegiance of the
people of Quebec would not have been in the least degree affected.
If, conversely, the British had occupied Maine, and had taken
similar proceedings there, the validity of the step could only
have been rested on the right of a state to secede, and on the
continued international existence of Maine as a member of the
family of nations. 37
Sometimes a state goes further, and instead of going to war at
all, secures the chestnuts to be picked out of the fire for it by
suborned revolutionaries. Of such was the nature of the opera-
tions against Colombia in Panama which were succinctly and
eloquently described by Roosevelt in four words--"I took the
Isthmus"-and he might equally well have added four more, and
explained,-"because I wanted it"-naturally, on the most ex-
alted and altruistic grounds. 38 Of a somewhat different com-
plexion is the attitude of a state which decides to adopt an insur-
rection independently initiated, and actively to support the
37 2 Nys, op. cit. supra note 22, at 50, says that the British imposed an
oath of allegiance on invaded districts of the United States. This must
have been due to the misguided zeal of some naval or military officer.
Nys's only authority, given in Vol. 3, at 241, is JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THU
WAR oF 1812-1815( 1882) 268, where it is stated that on July 11, 1814,
Sir Thomas Hardy, commanding the squadron before New London, occu-
pied Eastport and Moose Island, and proceeded to issue a proclamation de-
claring that all the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy had surrendered
and were thenceforward British territory, and that he gave the inhabitants
a week to choose between emigration and taking the oath of allegiance.
But this incident is of no value, standing by itself, and Nys is surely much
mistaken when he says that: "when a British force invades enemy terri-
tory, it forthwith becomes a 'domain of the King in right of his crown,'
and the inhabitants become British subjects. This is a principle of the
Constitutional Law of England." If it is, it is one of which the present
writer has never heard. The "oath of allegiance" tendered by Hardy was
probably of the same nature as that referred to in the Boedes Lust, not
operating any real change of allegiance, and not enabling the persons who
took if to be placed in the British army or navy.
38 Compare also the action of Sardinia in 1861, in actively encouraging
the Garibaldian insurrection in Naples, and in supporting the blockade by
the insurgents of Gaeta, with the result of driving the king from the two
Sicilies altogether, and enabling the country to be annexed by Sardinia.
Reference may also be made to the countenance given by France and Eng-




insurgents in their contest. This, as we have seen, may be
legitimate enough, but it is war.
When the French in 1792 invaded Italy, they had no scruple
in summoning the invaded populations to repudiate all allegiance
to their sovereigns, and doubtless they forced them with their
armies. Nys may tell us 39 that the French generals "limited
themselves" to breaking the tie between the invaded peoples and
their princes and to convoking assemblies to determine the form
of government.-" There is no doubt that the assemblies would
never have been permitted to reinstate the princes, or to estab-
lish any form of rule distasteful to the Republic; it was prac-
tically a reversion to the old type of conquest by occupation; the
later decree which Nys cites, directing the military authority to
suppress all existing authorities, taxes, feudal government and
privileges, in reality goes very little further. The whole drastic
proceeding was a consequence of the breaking away of France
from the sphere of International Law, and of her desire to re-
place it by a new Law of Nations of which the first article should
be---"no state may be organized on any but a soi-disant repub-
lican system." It was not that a monarchical state was neces-
sarily, as she expressed it, her enemy; it was not even a lawful
enemy. Some attention will have to be devoted in the future to
the question of whether it is possible that states may e.xist whose
principles and conduct put them outside the pale of International
Law, so that their subjects may forcibly be placed in the ranks
of their enemies. The recognition of such a possibility is ob-
viously very dangerous, and perhaps it may be preferable to keep
it in the background as a possibility not to be mentioned lest its
discussion should give encouragement to its misuse. It is fatally
easy for one State to say that another has put itself outside the
pale of International Law, when all that it means is that it much
dislikes its methods.
But on any view of the matter, that attempt by the French
to subvert the institutions of States and to replace their goverm-
ments by governments in hearty alliance with themselves, was a
revolutionary outburst. It is defended by no one as a legal
measure. It was one of the phenomena that present themselves
in a time of world upheaval. It took thirty years of war to
establish the principle that monarchies and republics could live
side by side, as it had taken thirty years of war, in the seven-
teenth century, to prove that Protestant States and Catholic
States could live side Uy side. International Law was not in-
39 Nys, op. cit. supra note 22, at 230.
40 See LoRRuOo, L'OcCuPATION DE GUEFRE (Paris, 1903) 161. Lorriot says
that by these measures "La Convention le zettait hors la loi et hors le
droit . .. HI faut voir dans ce derret une des causes premieres der Vingt-
trois annes de guerre qui suivirent.'
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yoked to justify it; it challenged the existing Law of Nations-
which, nevertheless, it failed to subdue.41
We cannot prevent such aberrations in such times. But the
recent cases of Cyprus and Egypt show what a clamant danger
exists in ordinary times. No special disregard for International
Law was avowed and proclaimed by the Allies. There was no
fury of parliamentarism among them, like the religious fury of
the seventeenth, or the revolutionary fury of the eighteenth cen-
tury. Russia was indeed, herself, a complacent despotism. Yet
the national status of subjects of the Porte was affected to be
converted, and the Ottoman troops turned against the Ottoman
Empire.42 It can easily be seen how facile and inevitable is the
next step-to secure a pronunciamento from some kind of local
tools, and on the strength of that to pose as allies and no longer
as invaders. Unhampered by the generous rule which compels
a belligerent to respect the loyalty of an invaded people, the in-
vader can treat the loyalty as transferred to his creatures, and
in effect to himself; and will enforce with all the rigor of sover-
eignty the obligation of the people to assist him on pain of the
penalties of treason.
Will any invader fail to seize the opportunity? Except in
cases where strong national feeling absolutely bars the attempt
as not worth the cost,4s will anyone hesitate to turn his enemies
from an invadeUl population into a sovereign ally? What is to
prevent its becoming common form for an invader to seat on a
mew and chilly throne, a figure arrayed in purple and stiff with
the gold brocade of sovereignty, but as dead and stiff itself as
its apparel-the simulacrum of a ruler, behind which flickers
the veiled form of an intruder and a usurper?
41 Its challenge, in a subtler and more insidious form, has been repeated
in our own days, when great leaders like Mr. W. Wilson have declined to
regard states as possessing a government (and therefore, implicitly, as be-
ing states at all) unless that government is based on votes and plebiscites.
42 It is possible that no Egyptians or Cypriotes actually fought against
the Turkish troops. But Egyptian troops at any rate must have garrisoned
Egyptiaa forts, and released British troops for service against the Turkish
forces.
43 The British government actually attempted to enforce conscription in
Ireland in the course of the War of 1914.
